British Generals in Blair's Wars (Military Strategy and Operational Art)

Much food for thought here. Few come out well and the bottom line is that politicians need to stop strutting and consider the long term objective while the military need to reappraise what their modern role is after successful completion of offensive action. This then needs to be agreed politically and adequately funded by the Treasury and properly supported and advised by a more integrated Civil service and Foreign and Comonwealth Office componant. Not one of the wars examined was properly considered at the outset. Much blood and little treasure was expended for few political gains but politicians feel no pain.

Lots of government civil service acronyms, and later a focus on process and bureaucratic worklife slow down and discourage the casual reader. Some interesting anecdotes and good factual information (makes a change from the usual partisan generalisations on this topic, from other sources). More human stories would have broadened the appeal, that said I'm quite sure it was not written to entertain!

An excellent collection of honest perspectives. It raised some enormous questions about the British Army and its misuse by politicians. Nothing has been learnt since the First Afghan War and the formation of IRAQ. Ambitious politicians, sycophantic civil servants and bungling generals are a lethal cocktail. The book could be entitled "How the British Army lost the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan".

An informative and at times revealing record. It is a shame the MOD would not permit serving Generals to contribute. A useful historical record

An excellent insight into the decision-making in Main Building during the Blair years. Highly recommended to all soldiers, sailors and airmen who need to know how they are led.