Years of Renewal Paperback – December 1, 1999

Very well-written documentation of the Ford Administration.

This is basically Henry's j'accuse, directed at the Democrats (and the occasional Republican) in congress who abandoned Vietnam to its fate: Ditto Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola etc. etc. The man has a case. These were not America's finest hours. And the book is well written. There are lots of transcripts of Henry crossing swords with his enemies abroad and his enemies (more numerous) at home. And he freely confesses his errors (or at least some of them.) But you get the impression this is written less for the public, than as a grave stone. And at 1151 pages, it's certainly big enough. Something shorter would have done as well - maybe "I told them this would happen...."

Indispensable for whoever is interested in the history of the Nixon and Ford administrations and othe world in these troubled times, from an unreplacable vantage point. Not exceedingly self-serving. Kindle edition welcome for this heavy book: you can carry all three volumes -The White House Years, Years of Upheaval and Years of Renewal- around with you, something that was impossible to do with the paper edition. And you have also a search function.

Dr. Kissinger, for all of his hubris and arrogance will truly go down in history as a great statesman. His intimate and sometimes self-deprecating writing style will keep the reader at the edge of their seat especially during the end of the Vietnam War and the crisis with Cyprus. All three volumes could very well serve as textbooks for anyone interested in the finer points of statecraft.

“Years of Renewal” is the conclusion of Henry Kissinger’s memoirs, this volume dealing primarily with the Ford years. The chapters are organized by topics: the transition, the Nixon legacy, the Ford Team, East-West relations, the Middle East, Indochina, Europe, Latin America, Communists, Southern Africa and, at the end, another transition.The author makes the point that he assumed duties beyond those of a routine Secretary of State because of Nixon’s increasing pre-occupation with political problems and Ford’s inexperience in foreign affairs. As the new president put it: ” Henry, I need you. The country needs you. I want you to stay.”This book reminds the reader about the rapid fire crises with which Ford and his team had to deal. Without the period between election and inauguration, Ford had to pick up where Nixon left off. He had to build on Nixon’s relationships with the Soviet Union and China while managing eruptions in Cyprus, perennial turmoil in the Middle East, and an immediate election season that returned a “McGovernite” Congress, only two years after McGovern had been soundly defeated.One of the gravest crises to face Ford was the collapse in Indochina. Kissinger gives an insider’s view of the analysis and efforts of the administration to obtain approval to restore aid to South Vietnam, as provided for in the Peace Accords, when the North made its final push to unify the country. After Ford conceded that the Vietnam War was over for the United States Cambodia provided a chance for America to send a message when it captured the Mayaguez. Kissinger makes the case that the Helsinki accords, though unpopular at the time, were an important step leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Toward the end Kissinger was involved in the breakthroughs leading to majority rule in Rhodesia, Southwest Africa and set in motion the process that brought it to South Africa.On these pages Kissinger tells his story and defends the administration. It is obvious that he respects Ford and resented the interference from the McGovernite Congress. He specifically highlighted congressional cutting of funds for Vietnam and Angola which left Kissinger with nothing to threaten or offer during his diplomatic negotiations.The tome is lengthy but the writing is superb. The reader is treated to a detailed journey through the foreign policy challenges of the Ford years. Kissinger provides his impressions of those with whom he worked with and against. Ford is shown as a calm leader under attack from both right and left who, while cognizant of political considerations never sacrificed the national welfare on the altar of political expediency. His impressions are not always flattering but always respectful and bare no secrets. “Years of Renewal” is a valuable contribution to the historical record of the Ford administration and should be read by anyone wanting to understand it or just remember the headlines of that era

It is hard to imagine that any future secretary of state will ever enjoy, if that is the right word, the power and responsibility invested in Henry Kissinger in the critical years 1974-76. For in this time frame he served an unelected president, Gerald R. Ford, on the heels of a constitutional crisis, the forced resignation of another president, Richard M. Nixon. His tenure included the agony of the final days of America's first lost war, the Viet Nam conflict, and the international perception that America was in a state of political disarray. Russia, Cuba, the Arab League, emerging African independence leaders, and scores of others would take advantage of this perception, which was not entirely wrong. The 1974 Congressional elections had brought to power what the author disparagingly referred to as McGovern Democrats seeking to reign in executive excesses of the Nixon years.This work was published in 1999, a quarter century after the events it narrates, and thus Kissinger must set the table with a lengthy prolegomena of the "Nixon Problem," so to speak. Kissinger, of course, had been there from the beginning in 1969 and does give his own tenure a cohesive organic flow. Though a Harvard professor and Rockefeller Republican, Kissinger proved to be a genuine cold warrior to Nixon's liking. To his credit, Kissinger's fascination with Nixon was tempered by his equally strong admiration for Metternich; thus he was able to channel Nixon's raw knuckle world view into such dramatic accomplishments as the opening to China.Gerald Ford was no Nixon, for better or worse. Kissinger, who generally subdues his paternalistic tendencies in this work, expresses genuine respect for Ford's decency but does not hide his opinion that Ford's Grand Rapids advisors were not quite ready for prime time, and probably would never be. Thus the table is set for a memoir of a beleaguered yet noble statesman moving incessantly around the globe, hamstrung by a president of modest skills and a slew of elected and bureaucratic enemies back home while maintaining a strong American visage toward the two nuclear superpowers and a staggering range of agendas of every sort.Self-aggrandizement came so natural to the author in his professional life that those of us who remember his career will scarcely take notice of it in this volume, the third of his executive trilogy. Kissinger believed that Nixon's foreign policy was on an essentially sound trajectory, particularly in relation to Russia and China. Thus his time under Ford was, in the secretary's mind, a crusade to continue this Nixon trajectory without Nixon. Détente, linkage, and triangulation--Kissinger's stock in trade--would be put to the test.In this 1100+ page work Kissinger spills a lot of ink on his dealings with China. He could hardly have foreseen the economic world order of 2010 and China's role today; in 1974 nuclear holocaust dominated diplomatic concerns, and diplomacy with China was still in its exploratory stages, with Chairman Mao still at the helm. Mao had the good political sense and the long historical view not to unduly burden Kissinger's day about Viet Nam. In other working relationships this would not always be the case.Kissinger had a better feel for the problems of his Russian counterparts, notably Premier Leonid Brezhnev, who was not as bold as Nixon in disengaging from the past and thus was held hostage to it. Not surprisingly the matter of arms control occupied much of the diplomatic calendar, often in a Russian exercise of face saving. Brezhnev's health and competence were further matters of concern.Certainly the most maddening and time consuming of Kissinger's international duties involved what has come to be known as his "shuttle diplomacy" between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Again, it is wise to reflect upon the times: Israel had fought back Egypt twice within the past decade, and little progress on such issues as Palestinian refugees could be made before more basic questions of boundaries and security were settled. To his credit Kissinger backed the right horse among Arab leaders, Egypt's Anwar Sadat, who shared something of Kissinger's long view of the region, and it is fair to say that the American secretary of state had certainly improved the prospects of the Carter Administration in the region several years later.Like his predecessors Kissinger worked with an eye toward the containment of communism. The ever-present threat of communist subversion in the 1970's was always on his mind, even as the American public was re-evaluating this cost, and communism certainly put Africa in Kissinger's sights. The major African flashpoint on his watch was Angola, where Cuba sent a liberation army of sorts in a clear gesture of both invitation to and intimidation of emerging African nations into the communist sphere.Kissinger's detailed accounts of his African work are intriguing to read. For the most part he was dealing with nations in a state of political adolescence, where aging heroes of the decolonization period wrestled with younger upstarts seeking advantageous international alignments. Kissinger knew many of the senior leaders and describes the charism of each along with the future shock of tribal peoples entering the family of nations.In Africa, as much as anywhere, we see Kissinger's existential play-calling severely hindered by an anti-war American backlast. In the case of Angola, for example, he was thwarted by the controversial "Tunney Amendment" which prohibited funding of covert American counter insurgence. But throughout his work Kissinger scorns the "McGovernites" in a way that suggests he never quite "got" Viet Nam. Having had no role in starting the war, he apparently believed his work should not be impeded by it, either.I do commend Dr. Kissinger's decision to take his time in publishing this third volume. The extra time has resulted in a particularly thoughtful analysis of a most peculiar time for American statecraft. The hubris, what there is of it, has been acquired honestly.

As described. Good service.

Book in excellent condition.