Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Modern War Studies) Paperback – Illustrated, April 28, 1999

This book is an objective retelling of the Rzhev battles that took place during Soviet "Operation Mars".Glantz' works are known for telling the story as it happened and within the limits of what available research archives can provide. For many years the "Operation Mars" battles were generally unknown unless they came from Western sources that used memoirs and military records from German archives. In this book Glantz also pulls in available Soviet-Russian archive material that was made available during Glasnoss to balance out the story.Enough about the text, which is very readable...but those maps!The maps found in this book are based on shades of gray. The "field areas" of the maps use a darkish gray background which forces map text to appear "highlighted" (white type instead of black type). I find this map graphical style to be extremely annoying...so 1 star off.

Operation Mars was launched a week after Operation Uranus and it was Stalin's attempt to encircle and destroy two German armies: the 6th at Stalingrad and the 9th Army in the Rzhev area. The final objectives were to destroy the German AGC and AGS with a good chance of ending the war in 1943.To give the reader a better understanding of the upcoming offensive, the author, a veteran and expert historian of the Eastern Front during WWII. summarizes the heavy fighting that occurred in the salient earlier in the year and to show the obsession of Zhukov in destroying AGC. He failed in that destruction in the Moscow offensive and he had to clear his reputation by a successful "Mars". This obsession will be shown to his detriment during the offensive. For more practical reasons, Stalin wanted that salient destroyed for it was only 100 miles due west of Moscow.The operational coverage is good. Mr Glantz describes in detail the battle coverage of the four main spearheads that would try to penetrate the salient at key sites but not at the shoulders. Two axes were on the western boundaries at Belyi and Luchesa Valley; one in the north at Molodoi Tud and the final one on the east side not far from Sychevka, the location of 9th Army's HQ.Initially the Soviets made good gains in most areas and it was looking like the 9th Army might break but as the Soviets gained ground and their lines thinned out, their advance slowed. Add to that the German defenses were built in depth and had key rivers as natural obstacles and most important of all, Model's expert redeployments of reserves, the Soviet advanced slowed further and then stopped. The German counterattack was able to pocket some of the Russians and were able to push the rest beyond the salient. It was a remarkable turnaround that cost Zhukov many men and tanks and saved Germany from destruction. With the gains in the south if Zhukov could have taken the salient destroying 9th Army, the war would have probably been over in 1943.To make it easier for the reader to follow the action, the coverage is divided into those four sections and each advance is discussed separately. To display the coverage chronologically with the sectors intermixed would have been impossible to follow. Insertion of periodic status reports also helped the reader to understand the mindset of the commanders and to follow the action.Even though the Germans were able to hold the salient, their losses would prevent them from keeping it. In March 1943, the OKH was finally able to convince Hitler, who had wanted to keep it for his next attempt on Moscow, to fall back and shorten the line. (Operation Buffalo)In the excellent Epilogue, Mr Glantz summarizes and draws his conclusions. The immediate costs and the future ramifications were listed. On the German side, the capable decisions of Model and his Corps commanders as well as the well prepared defenses made prior to the attack are reasons for German success. On the Soviet side the negatives are listed: The initial plans could have been better, the logistics were poor and Zhukov's refusal to stop the attack before December 20th as well as the bad weather are the key issues that cost Zhukov the offensive with such major losses. These are just some of the issues, Mr Glantz explains more fully.There are 24 full page maps that have a similar format of the maps in "The Battle of Kursk". The main map shows good detail and clearly show the initial Soviet progress. They also have a thumbnail map in the corner of the main map that shows the relative location of the map sector within the salient. A recurring problem with the maps is that the included legend showing key info on the participants was often wrong. A small photo gallery was included. A competent Notes section and Bibliography are present but its almost exclusively Russian sources and further study may be limited for many of us. An Appendix also provides a few key archival documents concerning the battle that the author feels is relevant.Also included was an excellent Order of Battle for the Kalinin and Western Fronts but nothing was presented for the German side which was disappointing. It appears the battle coverage is also almost exclusively based on Russian sources and with Zhukov and the Soviet government suppressing or possibly distorting the account, it would seem prudent to study the German records as well. As good as this accounting is, I have a hunch it could've been even better if the German archives were used as well.In addition to the OB, the Appendix also included several tables of statistics that serious students might appreciate.This was an important offensive during an important time of the war and Mr Glantz has done the public a service in presenting this historiography that seems to have been bypassed by other historians. It's a key element in my library and is highly recommended for serious students of the war. Readers who enjoyed this book might also enjoy the author's "After Stalingrad" that also has coverage of Operation Mars and many more maps among other offensives that occurred during late 1942 - early 1943 along the entire Front.

Colonel Glantz has furnished us an excellent account of MARS ,codeword which stood for Red Army operation to annihilate Rhzhev salient in the winter of 1942.The salient held by General Walter Model's 9th Army pointed like a dagger at the heart of Soviet capital. As author explains , the offensive conceived, planned ,executed by Marshal Zhukov was complex multi front operation involving several armies. Attacks launched by Kalinin and Western fronts from multiple axes delivered converging blows, one aimed at the apex of the salient and others at base. Defending Germans would be enveloped in a wall of fire and perish .Unfortunately for the Soviets the operation did not unfold in this manner. Why was that so ? Firstly, German defences in the approach axes of Red Army were anchored in depth. They erected complex web of defences involving pillboxes,bunkers,barbed wire entanglements several of which had interlocking fields of fire.To exacerbate matters, poor weather[ area blanketed by thick fog] prevented adequate reconnaissance. Consequently, several German dug-in strong points which remained obscured escaped destruction from preparatory Soviet artillery fire. Further no air support could be given as fog grounded all ground-attack aircraft.Soviets launched massed frontal assaults into the teeth of German defences and the result was horrible carnage. Despite staggering losses ,Russians kept on pressing attacks relentlessly. Here and there they made minor tactical gains gradually fighting degenerated into a brutal slugfest. From the nature of fighting , it could be seen that Soviet resources appeared virtually infinite. They could take any amount of losses and still keep on attacking . Such a tactic appears crude by all means .To the contrary, Germans displayed superior fighting skills. For weeks they kept superior Red Army forces at bay. Wehrmacht formed combat detachments which served as shock troops.German commanders dexterously manoeuvred armor along flaming cauldron parrying Soviet thrusts.Only thing Soviets gained from this botched offensive ,as author explains, they managed to exhaust the enemy. General Model realised he had no chance of withstanding a renewed Soviet assault and decided to vacate the Rhzhev salient. Fuehrer always averse to abandoning any territory grudgingly gave his approval.Marshal Zhukov reluctantly admitted defeat Author dubs it as Zhukov's greatest defeat. Latter conveniently suppressed this fact in his memoirs. Zhukov has projected it as an operation to pin down Wehrmact in the central front while great Soviet counter-offensive unrolled in the south. However Glantz after digging deep into the Soviet archives, scrupulously researching recently de classified documents offers a different interpretation. Far from being a minor operation ,MARS was a large-scale offensive which opened in conjunction with Stalingrad counter-offensive: URANUS,SATURN. Author's research shows, Zhukov lavished extraordinary armor,artillery,engineer support for the offensive. Stavka thought crumbling German defence around Stalingrad would force Wehrmact to send armored reserves south thereby denuding Rhzhev salient . This will pave the way for huge success along the Moscow-Berlin axis in the critical central sector.Closing chapter of the book contains some startling revelations. Glantz says Red Army after Stalingrad has potrayed its combat record as an unbroken succession of triumphs leading towards final destructuion of Nazi Germany. Such an argument is at best disingenuous and a blatant lie. Author's research shows Red Army successes has often been punctuated by defeats. Among the list of failures include first Kursk offensive February- March 1943, Byelorussian operation on the fall of 1943 and winter of 1944, East Prussian operation October 1944. More study needs to be done to uncover the full extent of these defeats and its implications on the execution of Soviet war effort.To sum up, Glantz has done an excellent job by exposing MARS as a military fiasco of unprecedented proportions which radically revises our understanding of eastern front in World War II.

David Glantz has written a great account of Operation Mars one of the many forgotten battles of the Eastern Front 1941-45, its sheer magnitude makes it actually one of the biggest battles in WW2, it was a failure of Zhukov and Red army high command of epic proportions in the aftermath the Soviets tried and pretty much succeeded in covering up their fiasco and incompitance in leadership over the backs of their own Red Army Soldiers who fought and fell heroicly for their country but where then scraped of the history books by their own government, their story was never told until now with Mr Glantz his true work of Scholarship, recommended and inadmisable for everyone interessted in the German-Russo war 1941-45!

Another great book by the master of the history of the eastern front,he shows in great detail the absolute slaughter the Russian leaders inflicted on thereown soldiers i.e. Zhukov in keeping the offensives going long after there was nopoint whatsoever in victory, No doubt to appease Stalin, great book buy it.

David Glantz at his best, the story is fast paced, very easy to read, and horrifyingly fascinating as the both sides suffer appalling losses, for no apparent reason. While primarily focussed on the Soviet side, the problems faced by the Germans are clear for all to see. Army Group Center only just survived, but it did, and therefore it won an almost unknown battle, that was instantly overshadowed by the catastrophe at Stalingrad.

Very detailed book. Shows division, brigade and some regiment movements around different parts of the Rzhev Salient.

It was an awesome read, and gives the reader, in no certain terms how the STAVKA, was not concerned about the waste of the Soldiers lives.