After Saigon's Fall: Refugees and US-Vietnamese Relations, 1975–2000 (Cambridge Studies in US Foreign Relations) Paperback – 26 May 2022

At 07:53hrs on 30th April 1975 CH-46 SWIFT 2-2 lifted from the roof of the US embassy in Saigon carrying Major James Kean and his eleven US Marines. The last US military forces in country. America’s war in Vietnam was over, Vietnam would no longer be a political thorn in America’s side. No, not for a moment. For the next twenty years the governments of the unified Vietnam and the US would argue back and forth over the fate of tens of thousands of refugees fleeing the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). This book explains in detail the painfully slow, complicated, and politicised negotiations and the tragic consequences of the process.I have several books in my collection that tell the story of the collapse of South Vietnam in early 1975 and the fall of Saigon in April 1975. The books are pervaded by profound sadness, desperation, and betrayal. I recall listening to US Army officer and author Stuart Herrington remembering leaving the US embassy grounds and looking out at all the Vietnamese who had been abandoned, the emotion still clear in his voice. If I recall correctly, he came out in LADY ACE O-9, on the same flight as US ambassador Graham Martin. All that effort, blood, and treasure ended with two helicopter flights: a cliché of the Vietnam War.Almost immediately a steady flow of refugees began to seek safety by boat mostly. This book tells the story of the enormously complex negotiations to safely stem this flow and arrange the safe departure of these desperate people. And the key role this matter had in the normalisation of relations between the USA and the SRV.The author highlights the twin tracks that guided the participants to the desired destinations. The primacy of the humanitarian issues and equally so the tragedy of the US PW/MIAs. The US rightly demanded that the SRV release the thousands of political detainees, many representatives of the former RVN. Their cause was stalwartly fought by the Families of Vietnamese Political Prisoners Association who were singularly successful lobbyists.Alas the same cannot be said for the National League of POW/MIA Families who lobbied for the recovery of US remains, the return of all live PWs, and a full accounting for the all the MIAs. The US Government (USG) made almost unachievable demands of the SRV to fully account for US PW/MIAs, an impossible task. And it should be noted that the numbers of US MIAs (each one a tragedy to be sure) is dwarfed by the numbers of PAVN/PLAF MIAs. The influence of the League probably reached its zenith in the shadow of the preposterous movie Rambo II which suggested that the SRV continued to detain US PWs. Onto this fire Reagan poured fuel and the whole issue became a raging political fire and obstacle to progress. The nadir came when as the author reports Bush told a gathering of the League to “sit down and shut up”. Let me be clear it is an undoubted fact that US personnel were captured, demonstrably so, and not released in 1973 but I do not believe that the SRV did continue to detain US personnel after 1975. There is a distressing history to be told but I do not think it will be written.As the author points out although the USG went to extravagant lengths to ostracise the SRV and would not regularise relations between the two states until 1995 it carried out lengthy discreet discussions on the humanitarian and refugee fall out of the end of the war. It was as though the USG had Jekyll and Hyde personality.There are civilian heroes such as Ginetta Sagan and Khuc Minh Tho who worked tirelessly and effectively to resolve the humanitarian issues. And to be fair to the USG it is refreshing to see refugees being treated as human beings in need not the ‘other’. It is difficult to imagine some recent US administrations being so enlightened.The author recounts how external political factors in both countries played a key role in the ultimate resolution of the issue. Principally perhaps the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist satellites, whereupon the US became the sole superpower (temporarily possibly) and could ease up on the anti-communist rhetoric. And the influence of commerce and economics should not be underestimated.I will be honest and suggest that this is a book for those with a serious, nuanced interest in the Vietnam war. To put in bluntly if you believe that the US could have won the Vietnam War with one more heave, this book is not for you. And to quote Blackadder “nobody gets into a sticky situation over a pound note.”I was aware of the issues at a basic level, but the sheer complexity of the topic was surprising. I think this book is an important addition to the canon of writing on the Vietnam War. I do not think I can put it better than the author: “By focussing the preponderant amount of our scholarly attention on the war’s origins and the military phase, we have overlooked some of the most compelling pages of the Vietnam War.”Do not make that mistake, read this book.

This is one of those rare books that is both pathbreaking in its research and arguments while also spinning an engaging and interesting story. Highly recommend for both specialists and non-specialists alike!