The City That Became Safe: New York's Lessons for Urban Crime and Its Control (Studies in Crime and Public Policy)

Loyd seems to have missed Table 1.5, which supplies the data supporting Zimring's textual notation that LA had a remarkable post-2000 surge in rate of decline for major crimes, and also shows that LA's accomplishment still fell short of that for NYC in that SAME post-2000 interval.Antone, on the other hand, seems to have entirely missed the last section of Appendix C in which Zimring discusses the methods used to verify declines in homicide and other major crime rates in spite of the fact that police reports of crime may be flawed by inherent conflicts of interest.This is an immensely complex and extensively documented book. Its central thesis, that brutally high crime rates are NOT a necessary feature of life in large urban centers in 21st century America, is very well documented.But be warned, this book's documentation and sophisticated statistical analyses are tough going. It deserves, and repays careful, critical and repeated reading. The novelty and hopeful character of its conclusions would warrant a steady climb in readership.

The book is chock-full of charts and diagrams, documentation and information. The amazing thing is that the old easy-answers about what causes crime and what reduces are wrong. The main thing is, we still don't know how New York did it for sure. But an 80% drop in violent crime since 1990 -- with no appreciable change in demographics, or all those other variables too numerous to mention. Putting people in jail for a longer time doesn't explain the drop either because New York didn't.I had to keep rereading and reviewing the book, though, because there's so much data I started to become a bobble-head.

Franklin Zimring clearly does his research. Throughout the reading of The CityThat Became Safe I was confident the information provided there-in was factual and that Zimring had verified it. There seems to be a sense of passion in his work as he passes on to his readers the valueable information, he has gathered, that impacts an entire culture. I look forward to reading more of his work as the opinions I form from reading his books will help to direct my thoughts as I enter the voting booth.Ralph Spinelli

This book was needed for my class and it was delievered very quickly and in good condition in time for me to read and take my 1st exam.

can't keep the damn thing shut

This book is a much longer version of an article title 'How New York Beat Crime' in Scientific American, 8/2011, that reports on New York City's largest and longest sustained drop in street crime. Rates of homicide, robbery and burglary dropped by more than 80%; by 2009 the homicide rate was lower than in 1961, the risk of being robbed was less than one sixth its 1990 level, and the risk of car theft had declined to one sixteenth. The city's experience has shown many of our assumptions about crime are wrong, including that lowering crime requires first tackling poverty, unemployment and drug use, and that it requires throwing many people in jail.The first nine years of its crime decline were part of a broader national trend - a drop of nearly 40% that began in the early 1990s and ended in 2000. New York went from being in the middle of New York, Houston, Philadelphia, Chicago, and L.A. to the lowest of the five - more than 30% lower than the next best city. NYPDs data are corroborated by county health department data of all deaths, as well as insurance claim data. Victim surveys confirmed the dip in both robberies and burglaries.The percentage of the population in the most arrest-prone age bracket (15-29) declined at essentially the same rate as nationally, and economic growth was not a factor. In the most populous boroughs (Queens, Brooklyn, Bronx), diversity did not drop (it did in Manhattan) - yet, crime went way down, at comparable rates, in all four of those boroughs. At the same time, drug use appears to have stayed relatively stable, per overdose deaths, hospitalizations for drug treatment, urine tests of criminal suspects.As for incarcerations - the rate rose during 1990-97, but only 15%, and then fell. By 2008 it was 28% < 1990 rate, vs. nationally, being up 65%. The rate former New York prisoners ere reconvicted because of a felony three years after release increased during the late 1980s, but fell 64% after 1990.Beginning in 1990, the city added over 7,000 cops and made its efforts more aggressive and focused. After 2000, it cut the force by more than 4,000.Instead of emphasizing 'broken-windows' policing of marginal neighborhoods, police emphasized 'hotspots.' CompStat began in 1994.Finally, the New York Times (12/30,2011) reported current problems with and an on-going investigation of police not reporting crimes and underclassifying crimes.The problem I have with the book is that in it the author contends that while the average large U.S. city's crime declined around 40% between 1991-2000, New York's decline continued and amounted to twice as much overall, while the decline stopped elsewhere. However, his Table 1.4 shows L.A., Chicago, Dallas, Philadelphia, and Detroit as also reporting across-the-board declines in all reported categories between 2000-09; San Diego would also be included in that group but for the robbery category, in which it had no decline. Thus, this makes the author's efforts to explain New York City's 'unique' continued decline fallacious. The book, however, was interesting.The traditional answer (more jail cells) was not 'the answer.' The number of incarcerated residents did rise 19% from 1990 to 1997, but then fell to 10,000 fewer in 2008 than 1990 - nationally, however, incarceration rates rose 65% over that same period.A major disappointment in reading the book was that it includes no information from those leading Bratton's policing revolution - just lots of data accompanied by his own interpretations. Nonetheless, his pointing out that prostitutes and illegal gamblers were largely ignored made sense - they were not usually involved in violent crime. Yet, elsewhere Bratton countered Zimring's conclusion stating 'I'm a strong advocate of broken windows policing.' ('Customers' cars were seized, and their names and photos published - cutting demand, but not via arresting more prostitutes.)Zimring's assertion that stopping and frisking was ineffective because the proportion stopped with guns fell 39% between 1993 and 1995 makes no sense. Similarly, there is reason to contend Zimring misinterpreted the reason for declining jail/prison populations - turns out misdemeanor arrests actually doubled, possibly because potential felony committers were stopped before committing a felony. Questioning teens who appear to be casing a possible victim might prevent a robbery, though add to the number of controversial street stops.Unfortunately, the material is tedious and not well organized - making assimilation difficult. While he concludes 'life-threatening crime is not an incurable urban disease in the U.S.,' his material does not explain 'Why?'

A masterpiece of policy analysis, especially Chapter 5, which details and evaluates methodically a wide range of reforms—organizational, tactical, and more—to policing in New York City. While clear, chockfull of helpful charts and tables, and sometimes amusing, it’s a real slog of a read. In the end, though, it’s well worth the effort. Even readers knowledgable on crime and crime policy are likely to have their preconceptions challenged by this cogent, hyper-analytic unpacking of New York City’s stunning 80% decline in serious crimes in the 90s and 00s.

This is a well written, well researched, and important book. (You can read an excellent summary of the main points, written by Zimring himself, at [...]There are some caveats, however. After you read "The City That Became Safe," be sure to read "The Crime Numbers Game: Management by Manipulation (Advances in Police Theory and Practice)" by John A. Eterno and Eli B. Silverman. There's a substantial free preview at this link: [...]The NYPD recently released a review of Compstat, the city-wide computer system that tracks crime. You can download the report, free, at [...]

A bit technical, too much methodology

Much too academic. Lots of information but no put together in a way that is helpful for a non-specialist readr.