The Age of the Ship of the Line: The British and French Navies, 1650-1815: Studies in War, Society, and the Military

Jonathan Dull is a formidable academic naval historian. His "The French Navy and the Seven Years' War" is so much more than just naval history, it sets the actions of both the French and Royal Navy (and later the Spanish) firmly in the context of diplomacy, war aims, finance and the accompanying land campaigns. What a pleasure therefore to find he has taken that level of detailed knowledge and transferred it to the entire period of 1650 to 1815. Even more pleasing is to see this has been achieved without producing a long tome. Where a historian knows so much there is always the risk he will tell us much, and distil little. It takes great discipline to avoid this, as Pascal said "I have made this letter longer than usual because I lack the time to make it shorter."All too often my reading leads me to concentrate on one period and to forget what came before and after. In considering, for example, the lack of French sailors in the Napoleonic Wars I had entirely forgotten the loss of Huguenot mariners following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The sheer size of the fleet of Louis XIV also eluded my memory as did the effects of the period of Anglo-French peace before the Austrian War. Dull puts these all in context harvesting a lot of useful data from the works of, inter alia, Jan Glete.If you have an interest in naval history in this period you will find this book, variously, an excellent introduction to more detailed works and a useful overview to help develop your understanding from those detailed works. Additionally because Dull goes beyond the fleets and campaigns into what lies beneath you will find an excellent analysis of the nature of the Anglo-French struggle and its asymmetries.Excellent stuff.

This is a serious syudy of the subject written by a leading academic. If you are interested in this subject then you should have this book

This is a good introductory volume to the military history of Europe in the late 17th century and the 18th century. It is clearly written and informative, and would be suitable for younger readers. It is a small book in terms of dimensions, not much bigger than a paperback, and has large font. The chapters are:1. The Ship of the Line begins its reign. p1.2. Louis XIV and his Wars. p103. Foolish Wars end an Age of Peace. p344. Sea Power and the Outcome of the Seven Years' War. p635. Winners and Losers in the War of American Independence. p916. Change and Continuity during the French Revolution. p1187. The Role of Navies in the Age of Sail p1618. The Ingredients of Supremacy in the Age of Sail. p179Notes and Further Reading. p189Index. p239Although titled 'Ship of the Line', this is not a book about naval battles as such, at least not in the earlier chapters. From the Seven Years' War onwards, sea-power becomes more and more dominant in the narrative, but it is about the role of sea-power, and maritime affairs rather than the ins-and-outs of battles. If you are more interested in the battles themselves and how they were fought, try  Command at Sea  and  Fighting at Sea in the Eighteenth Century: The Art of Sailing Warfare . However, as I said above, this is a good introduction; and the Notes contain a wealth of information on further books to read.I have just a couple of points of dispute with the book. On page 31:"On 24th July 1704 the English and Dutch captured lightly defended Gibraltar. The French navy then won the war's only major action between lines of battle, the Battle of Malaga (13th August 1704), even though its fifty ships of the line were outnumbered by a combined fleet of forty-one English and twelve Dutch ships of the line commanded by Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Rooke. The French commander, Admiral Louis-Alexandre de Bourbon, comte de Toulouse, an illegitimate son of Louis XIV, failed, however, to follow up his victory by recapturing Gibraltar".N.A.M. Rodger, in his  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815  describes it as follows (pp169-170):"The French fleet, now commanded by Louis XIV's bastard son the comte de Toulouse... was too late to prevent the fall of Gibraltar, but advanced to fight for its recovery. On 13th August the two fleets met off Malaga, the French being to leeward, but between the allies and Gibraltar. The allies had fifty-three ships of the line (41 English and 12 Dutch) against, probably, 50 French... It was a hard-fought battle (the English casualties were proportional to those of Trafalgar)... At the end of the day neither side had a decisive advantage... the allies were seriously short of ammunition. Next day a shift of wind gave the French the weather gauge and the opportunity to renew the action, but the majority of Toulouse's senior officers persuaded him that 'what we did yesterday will suffice for the reputation of the Navy and the king's arms', and the French fleet returned to Toulon. Only a minority understood that they had fought for a tangible strategic objective, Gibraltar, which a final effort might well have regained.""In England, Tory politicians opposed to the war on the Continent tried to cry up Rooke and his battle as a counterweight to Marlborough and Blenheim."Not quite such an obvious victory for the French, then.On page 157:"After the squadron [of three ships] from Toulon moored at Algeciras (near Gibraltar), it beat off an attack by six British ships of the line and captured one of them."N.A.M. Rodger again:"There he was attacked on 6 July 1801 by Rear-Admiral Saumarez from Cadiz with 5 ships of the line. Linois had anchored his ships inshore under cover of batteries, but the wind dropped as the British approached and the attack failed badly. One ship grounded and was captured, the rest were driven off with damage."I'm sorry, Jonathan, but running aground isn't really quite the same as being captured in battle.I would also like to recommend E.H. Jenkins'  History of the French Navy . "Although quite cursory, Jenkins's book remains the best survey in English of the seventeenth and eighteenth century French navy"; Notes and Further Reading, page 195. Jenkins notes that one of the problems of Ancient-Regime French naval command was that officers would not accept orders from superior officers with lower social status. They would also deem it dishonourable to abandon their ship, and would remain with it when it sank. I don't know if that was the origin of the alleged tradition of the captain remaining with his sinking ship.