The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914

MacMillan presents a conventional retelling of the origins of the war. Other recent books have tried to find different scapegoats but MacMillan mostly avoids the blame game. However, she suggests that the German army's need for a quick victory was perhaps the main cause. MacMillan presents the facts and allows you to reach your own conclusions. She believes that the statesmen in 1914 could have done more to stop the war and shows that things would probably have turned out differently had Germany been less belligerent. She tries to avoid controversy. MacMillan's thesis, as her title implies, is that Europe was a peaceful place before 1914, but harmony was interrupted when a few powerful people became convinced of the wisdom of war. MacMillan shows that the war could and should have been avoided. Her book is well written but light on analysis.MacMillan starts by explaining the fears of each of the belligerents. She provides entertaining profiles of the strange cast of characters who made the decisions. Her observations are often funny and irreverent. Most of the statesmen appear odd to a modern reader. Few of the leaders can be described as wise or prescient. Macmillan writes that "it was Europe and the world's tragedy in retrospect, that none of the key players in 1914 was great and imaginative leaders who had the courage to stand out against the pressure building up for war."By the late 19th century Germany had become Europe's largest economy and the Kaiser wanted a "place in the sun." MacMillan mentions that Wilhelm II may have suffered brain damage at birth which may help explain his erratic behavior. Wilhelm scared people with his bombastic and belligerent statements. He alienated his relatives in the British royal family. Both Edward VII and Lord Salisbury questioned his sanity. Germany had begun throwing its weight around, unnerving its neighbors. MacMillan believes that had Bismarck still been around things would have turned out differently.France was scared of Germany after its crushing defeat in 1871. It wanted allies and worked hard to woo Britain and Russia. The French provided financial support to Russia. This alliance dragged France into the Balkans where it came to Russia's aid. Britain traditionally favored a policy called splendid isolation. MacMillan includes a quote from British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury who once said that "English policy is to float lazily downstream, occasionally putting out a diplomatic boat-hook to avoid collisions." Britain's policy changed in the early 1900s. It was worried about the growing threat of the German navy and decided it needed allies. It picked France and Russia. Former Prime Minister, the Earl of Roseberry, predicted that an alliance with France would lead to war with Germany.Herbert Asquith, the British prime minister from 1908 to 1916, delegated foreign policy to Sir Edward Grey who had been Foreign Secretary since 1905. Grey was pro-French and viewed Germany as Britain's chief enemy. However, he was also secretive and duplicitous. He maintained, even in his memoirs, that Britain was a free agent and had no formal obligations to France. Grey had apparently given verbal assurances to France and Russia that Britain would come to their aid if they were attacked, but he was careful not to put anything in writing. Grey also left it too late to get involved when the situation started to unravel in the summer of 1914. Nobody was quite sure where Britain stood and if it would choose war.The break-up of the Ottoman Empire created tensions in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Russia all competed for influence. Germany wanted allies but the only country left was the Austrian-Hungarian Empire which was falling apart. The price of the alliance was high, drawing Germany into the clash between Austria and Russia. The Austrians were worried about their many Slavic subjects rebelling. Serbia, which had recently broken away from the Ottoman Empire, was looking to expand and grab territory from Austria. MacMillan describes Serbia as "reckless" while Christopher Clark, has called it a rogue state. The Austrians viewed the Serbs as dangerous neighbors and an existential threat. After the assassination in Sarajevo of Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist, Austria-Hungary delivered a harsh ultimatum to Serbia. Rather than rein in Austria, the Germans offered them a blank check. Russia saw itself as a protector of the Slavic peoples, including the Serbs. As a result, Austrian and Russian interests clashed head-on.The German army reported to the Kaiser, but by 1914 it was acting independently. When Wilhelm tried to persuade Austria to moderate its actions in the Balkans, Moltke, the head of the German army, was at the same time advising the Austrians to crush the Serbs. Moltke fell-out with the Kaiser over the inflexibility of the Schlieffen plan. When the Russians mobilized their army, the Kaiser decided he wanted to go to war with Russia but not France. He was told this was impossible by Moltke. The decision to invade Belgium brought Britain into the war and alienated the United States. Moltke decided that a quick victory was Germany's only chance of winning the war so he wanted a war sooner rather than later. Moltke feared that by 1916 or 1917 Russia would become too powerful to attack. He also did not fear Britain, the British army was too small to worry about, and he expected the UK to enter the war on the side of France.The British cabinet was originally split between interventionists who wanted to help France (e.g., Grey, Churchill and Asquith) and those that favored neutrality. Moltke solved the problem when he sent the Belgians an ultimatum. This became the final straw for Britain. David Lloyd George had considerable influence in the cabinet. He would become prime minister in 1916, and he had been sitting on the fence. After the ultimatum, Lloyd George moved into the pro-war camp and a majority now favored war.MacMillan does not agree that Germany deliberately started the war but argues that the country effectively chose war by giving Austria unconditional support and through the army's refusal to modify the Schlieffen plan. MacMillan also seemed to imply it was mostly Moltke's fault because he seemed to be constantly meddling and pushing Germany towards war.

As we approach the centennial anniversary of the outbreak of World War One we should pause to reflect on the terrible loss that conflict brought. In terms of western culture, 1914 was truly a watershed year that ended one way of life and introduced another. Margaret MacMillan followed up her epic study of the Versailles Treaty with this equally impressive work. She attempts to show how the war came about primarily because too many people either wanted war or did not do enough to prevent it from happening. The result is perhaps the most thorough analysis of the pre-1914 world available to the modern reader.MacMillan begins her book with an account of the major players (France, Germany, Russia, Britain, and Austria-Hungary) to illustrate their national hopes and dreams pitted against their fears and suspicions andn introduces the reader to the primary individuals who helped shape national policy. She then looks at the psychology of war and the peace efforts and compares them to the militarism that each nation experienced. She describes how the new concept of public opinion helped drive the leaders towards certain decisions. Next she looks at the series of run ups to the Great War's outbreak, Morocco, Bosnia, the Balkan Wars, and even the assassination of the Austrian archduke and his wife. None of these events meant that war was ultimiately inevitable. So long as there were at least some key players willing to negotiate and work through differences, war could be avoided.MacMillan concludes that war came about because the forces that sought it outnumbered and outmanourvered those who did not. But she also works to debunk myths that have evolved over the years. Germany and the Kaiser were not solely responsible for war in 1914. Germany had repeated backed down in the face of international pressure during the Morocco crises of 1905 and 1911. The Kaiser, while having the personality that modern day people would call a "jerk" (or worse), had a way of standing down at the last minute. Granted, he was fascinated with all things military, he was the inheritor of the Prussian military tradition, but he did not set out to bring war upon the world as he has often been blamed for doing. She also critiques the Anglo-French entente that developed after 1904. Britain and France were not a unified front as British leaders continually looked for ways to be non-committal in backing France on international affairs. She also looks at the relationship between France and Russia, and considers the challenges facing Austria-Hungary and the upstart Serbia. All of these have had myths develop around them and MacMillan works through the hyperbole to understand the root causes of national decisions. In fact, MacMillan ultimately blames no one and everyone for the war. The Great War, and she uses this term throughout the book, was the sum total of government's unwillingness to resort to diplomacy when the world needed eiplomacy the most.MacMillan is not only a fine historian but is also an excellent writer. Thoughout the book she interjects modern analogies to compare with her subject matter to help illustrate her points. One key such analogy appears near the end of the book when she states how John F. Kennedy employed diplomacy against the advice of his advisors in part because he had recently read Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August. Kennedy gave diplomacy a chance, the players of 1914 did not.MacMillan's writing style is crisp and lively. Truly, there is never a dull moment in this book. College history courses should utilize this book. The leaders of today should read this book. The average citizen who thinks that guns and war solve problems should read this book. There are lessons to be learned from MacMillan that need to be understood and appreciated. This book has all the makings of a Pulitzer Prize and as such cannot be discounted by anyone who is in the position of decision-making in international affairs. And on a large scale, that really means all of us, as public opinion is now counted for much by politicians and pollsters. This book should remain the standard for a long time to come, much like her work in Paris 1919 remains the standard for understanding our modern world as it resulted from the Paris peace conference.

In this long but easy-to-read volume, Professor MacMillan describes the events leading to the world’s greatest ever traffic accident. She shows that, while all the various parties with their varied and often wildly divergent interests actually didn’t want war, for various reasons (fear, honour, national pride, wanting to be perceived as a great power or simply taken seriously, and fear for the future in a changing world) they were prepared for it. Indeed, many seemed to accept it as inevitable and even necessary. In the succession of minor (and generally successfully defused) international crises leading to the First World War, the parties were often to be found calculating when they could afford to go to war, and perhaps more importantly, how this related to the preparedness of the putative adversary, even to the point of contemplating a pre-emptive strike. However, they were all basically relying on bluff, and had given relatively little thought as to what would happen when all the bluffs were called.Whose fault was it? Everybody’s and nobody’s. They all – Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Serbia – made individual blunders in the affair. Those individual blunders were of themselves survivable, but together they represented a pile of tinder. The spark was the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo and the pig-headed determination of Austria-Hungary, backed by the thoughtless “blank cheque” provided by Wilhelmine Germany, to use this as a reason have it out with the detested Serbia, but the tinder was ready and waiting.Professor MacMillan brilliantly brings out all the varied threads of these events of a century ago, reinforcing Christopher Clark’s “sleepwalkers” thesis in his book of the same name. Besides, it was (a) not going to be that bad, and (b) all over by Christmas anyway. Pity nobody happened to mention which Christmas.Only one teensy-weensy niggle – Erich Ludendorff was never ennobled, so he was never “von Ludendorff”.

Once in a while a book comes along that absolutely fulfils my interests. Such, is Margaret MacMillan’s book. It was an extraordinary read, 699 pages of fairly small font and, as such, a massive undertaking by the author and her team. One might imagine that such a tome would be top heavy with data- overload and difficult to read. Far from it. This book simply flowed as she undertook strenuous analysis of the causes of the Great War, from Austro Hungarian designs on the Balkans, to the defence of Serbia by Russia through to a German quest to have their-day-in-the-sun not to mention alliances, which drew Great Britain and France into the conflict. I particularly enjoyed the comparisons that were drawn between events leading to the Great War and subsequent events in history. By 1914, Europe had truly run out of luck and the conflict became somewhat inevitable. However, as concluded by the author, poor decisions were made at the wrong times as the Great Powers slid into the mire of world war 1. The immense background to those decisions are charted in this volume. A wonderful book.

I have many history books covering the First World War, but this one by Margret MacMillan certainly rates as one of the best I’ve read.Covering over 600 pages, it includes many details that I hadn’t come across before, and MacMillan’s writing and passion for the subject is present in every sentence. The War that Ended Peace is a long book but an accessible history that I would recommend.I hope you find my review helpful.

Comprehensive and thoroughly-researched review of the events leading to the Great War. I found it illuminating in its description of social as well as political and military history. It includes aspects such as public opinion and the personalities of the political players. I now have a better understanding, not only of the events that led to the War but the dynamic conditions that led to the catastrophe of 1914. The style is easy-to-read and there were times when I could not put the book down. Recommended.

This book was both easy to read and an all-encompassing history of the events that led to the Great War. Indeed, it was more than that, as it showed how events as far back as the Franco-Prussian war influenced the views and actions of those who played a key role in 1914.It chose not just to concentrate on the major players, but also how rivalries in Africa and central European ethnic groups sucked in the bigger powers and often led to the tail wagging the dog.For a topic that has been so well covered, I learnt much that was genuinely new to me and made me realise how little I understood about that part of our continent.An excellent book and one I would wholly recommend to anyone who wants to understand how the world we live in today was shaped and the signs we should look for that may indicate the long peace is under threat.