The Luftwaffe's Way of War: German Air Force Doctrine, 1911-1945 Hardcover – January 1, 1998

An OK book, but not all that exciting. It was interesting to read the English translations of the original German directives and regulations that established how the Luftwaffe fought WW II. But if you are already familiar with the Luftwaffe's initial success and eventual demise, you probably won't find anything enlightening here. There is almost no analysis of whether or not these directives resulted in a successful aerial warfare doctrine over the long run. In view of the fact that the Luftwaffe had essentially collapsed by the end of 1943 or early 1944, there were obviously some problems. Clearly those problems weren't all a result of improper doctrine. That, in my opinion, is the great weakness of the book -- there is no discussion of the many reasons for it's ultimate failure and how or if those reasons can be traced to the very conceptions on which it was created. There is also no discussion of the failure to implement several ideas originally developed in the 1920s. For example, in one of the chapters there is a discussion on the importance of using air power as a naval weapon. But the Luftwaffe notoriously developed little effort for this subject. Only a single unit (Fliegerkorps IX) was ever created to attack warships and cargo shipping at sea and it was overstretched from the very beginning.So--if you're curious about learning the original doctrinal bases for the Luftwaffe's methods for waging war, then by all means read this book. Just don't expect any critical analyses of whether these doctrines were successful over the long term of WW II and, if not, why they failed.