Special Signed Edition of WHITE HOUSE YEARS (Limited to 3,500 Copies) Hardcover – January 1, 1979

Regardless of your personal feelings about some of Kissinger s specific foreign policies his writing style is straightforward in his personal honest discriptons of everyone involved especially RN. If your not fascinated by upclose and personal narratives of some of the US most significant foreign policy issues Vietnam India and China then the length and detail in this first of three volumns may be difficult to get through

The first thing I noticed was that the book had no jacket, but I didn’t mind because it was the book that I purchased not the book jacket. It was in great condition and I am happy to have gotten it.

Kissinger is a German-born origin, now American Politician. There were countless attacks from left, right and center on the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. Perhaps his German background prompted a writer in the ""Nation"" to draw a resemblance between Kissinger and Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Nazi foreign minister. (Couldn't they ever forget?)In his memoirs, Kissinger alludes to the years he served as National Security adviser and one can fathom a touch of boasting on how much, in the eyes of many observers, his initiatives and allure was the main rescuing feature of an otherwise disastrous administration (Watergate!!).His appointment as Secretary of State aroused not only favorable editorials; there was a great deal of unfriendly comment as well. Some reflected envy and grudging ill-will; there must have been many political gurus firmly convinced that they would have been able to do as good, and even a much effective, job than Kissinger. During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a showy personality like brightly colored movie stars, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities and in his pictures he appeared very much in joy at such occasions; at times his name was transfused to "'Henri the Kiss"" something like a sex reference, didn't he say "Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac?"" Very few photos show him frowning; otherwise his face has always been smiley. His foreign policy record made him the feared goddess of vengeance to the anti-war groups as well as to the anti-communists.His memoirs portrays him as the devout advocate of ""Realpolitik"", and tell us how far the man played a dominant role in USA foreign policies between 1969 and 1973. In less than five years, he `taught' the world the policy of `'détente" that led to a significant relaxation in U.S.-Soviet tensions and played a crucial role in 1971 talks with China's Premier Zhou Enlai that concluded with a rapprochement between the two countries (tennis games) and the formation of a new strategic anti-Soviet Sino-American alliance.His help and energy to put an end to the fighting in Vietnam rewarded him the Nobel Peace Prize (1973). But the subsequent events failed him dearly when a ceasefire in Vietnam could not remain durable.Kissinger preferred the maintenance of friendly diplomatic relationships with anti-Communist military dictatorships in many places in Latin America, however he approved of half-hidden intervention in Chilean politics. Such disguised approach caused him the accusation of encouraging and taking part in the atrocities committed by the Argentine military junta. Looking at his accomplishment, one cannot but associate his name (and indeed his personality) mainly with:Détente and the opening to ChinaVietnam and Cambodia1971 Indo-Pakistan Warfalling short of reviewing:1973 Yom Kippur War1974 Turkish invasion of CyprusKissinger was never connected with the Watergate scandal which eventually ruined Nixon and many of his close associates. The media labeled Kissinger as the ""clean man"" of the "Bunch""I wonder why he did not mention in these memoirs the notion that prevailed for a short period of ending the requirement that a U.S. president be born in America. Some examined the possibility of amending the U.S. Constitution so that Kissinger could have a chance to run for President of the United States of America.Perhaps what's missing in details for us in the Middle East is the 1973 Yum Kippur War. The memoirs, unfortunately, ended on the borders of 1973. From page 1290 until the end of the chapter we figure some secret channels between Sadat and Kissinger, we do not know how far such talks have led to the 1973 War. Was the war really surprising? Kissinger negotiated the end to the war, which had begun with a massive and, a so called, surprise attack against Israel by Egyptian and Syrian regular armies. According to Kissinger, if Israel had begun the war, they would not have received "so much as a nail" in aid from the United States. But since the Arabs started it all, the U.S military performed the largest military airlift in history, that led to the 1973 OPEC embargo against the United States and its Western European allies, which was lifted in March 1974.When Israel recovered back most of the lands they lost during the initial stage of the `'surprise'' attack, the Israeli Army mounted a counter attack and regained some more territories. In this debacle Kissinger became the actual movie Star in this part of the world. USA, with the nickname: Uncle Sam became Uncle Henry (or Dear Henry). Kissinger was able to pressure Israel to cede some of the newly captured land back to the Arabs, contributing to the first phases of lasting Israeli-Egyptian peace. The move saw a warming in U.S.-Egyptian relations, bitter since the 1950s, as the country moved away from its former pro-Soviet stance and into a close partnership with the United States.Can we ever get the whole truth from the memoirs of shrewd politicians in the caliber of Henry Kissinger?, or only time can tell!!

It is almost impossible to do justice to this weighty tome.This is a benchmark - by any consideration - pagination, intellectual mastery or sheer literary expression. It terms of sagacious insight, concentrated and logical thinking, it is in a class of its own.Kissinger expresses himself with a clarity and power bordering on the poetic.There are passages and pages which, for their sheer artistry and mastery, one can permanently savour. Here is nothing of the Spenglerian pomposity, or tortuous language found in so many intellectually-overburdened writings.Its polished syntax makes the scribblings for which Nobel Prizes are commonly awarded, look patently silly.Forget that the issues - Nixon, SALT, Vietnam, Communist hegemony, El Salvador etc - may be irrelevant now.This is about entering the domain of an superbly astute man, and having the privilege of sharing his thinking.Abandon the idea of `reading it', as if it is something to done. It is to be savoured and returned to again and again - like a fount of wisdom.

One reads this book because it is a first hand account of one of the most dynamic and divisive eras in US history, and to truly understand what happened it is necessary to hear from those people who were instrumental in the policies that were implemented. This is what this book does; it gives the reader perspective. The inside account from one of the most influential men of this time is a must for anyone wanting to understand this history. With that said this book has many problems as well, and at times may confound more than it enlightens which is why I gave three stars and titled my review as mixed. The writing is not great by any means, and the book is a labor. The author's prose does not carry the reader along and most of the work is dense.One of the things that grated on me the most was the author's tone in sections of the book. He sounds more like a spoiled, petulant child rather than an educated, hard-nosed bureaucrat. Throughout the entire work the author repeatedly goes on for paragraphs and pages about how mean the papers were to Nixon and his administration. Over and over again the reader is subjected to snippets of critical articles written about the administration. This would have been alright once or twice but the author bludgens the reader with negative articles over and over again. Any potential reader is going to know this was a wrenching moment in US history so the idea that he has to keep driving this point home is ridiculous, and the author doesn't spend nearly as much time explaining that the administration's paranoia and secrecy was probably a pretty big factor in their PR problems. The other thing is HK continually talks about the war the Nixon administration "inherited" from the previous administration. As if the presidency of the United States or the NSA position are the equivalency of male pattern baldness. The idea that they "inherited" these problems is absurd. The American people didn't beg Nixon to become president. He ran for this position as hard if not harder than almost anyone who has ever aspired to this position, so the idea that either of these men inhereted these problems is pushing the bounds of incredulity.As for the sections on Vietnam, the most compelling and enlightening sections are his insider accounts of the negotiations. This is where the value lies. The author basically takes the reader into the room with him giving details and descriptions that the reader really can't get anywhere else. The ability to see the inside negotiations and also the discussion inside the administration that set policy was invaluable. The reader can't get this kind of information anywhere else, and this is why this book has to be read to understand what really happened and why.With that said I had problems with his analysis at times. It always shines a too favorable light on the administrations decisions. He does this by ignoring, completely, anything that may contradict his favorable rendering. He never discusses the major problems of the Thieu presidency and its own lack of legitimacy as well as it less than democratic tendancies. The reader gets the impression that Thieu is just a patriot and honorable man doing the best he can for his country. The major political problems are simply ignored. The other problem I have is the author delves into morality when discussing Vietnam. The problem for the author is this opens himself up to other areas of critique. He can make the case for his policies on the grounds of Realpolitik and simple US interest, but when making a moral case he opens himself up for the argument that in the end his policies were basically going to do nothing but trade a communist totalitarian rule for a right wing military dictatorship. The author never admits this, and in fact the picture he paints is one where South Vietnam was on the verge of US style republicanism. This is optimistic to say the least.The other problem is the author goes back and forth when discussing the North Vietnamese. Early on he talks about how they are implacable enemies willing to hold out forever and take any amount of pain the US can inflict. An enemy willing to go underground and be bombed into the stone age if necessary, but then when discussing the end of the war for the US he begins to describe an enemy ready, even eager, to end the war. At this point the US congress becomes the enemy, and if only they didn't have to race against the clock then they could force ever increasing demands on the North. Of course the administration's own secrecy doesn't deserve some blame, nor is the 180 degree turn in the enemy explained by the author.The other major part of the book focuses on the relationship with Russia. This is another area that shines. It goes along way in explaining why and how things went the way they did, and it also does a great job in showing the dysfunctionality of the Soviet system. The author gives the reader a great juxtaposition of the two differing systems which illustrates the dynamism of US politics as apposed to the single minded and determined approach of the Soviets. He does a good job illustrating the negatives and positives of both systems and giving examples of how these played out in the relationship.The one area where I had problems is the author tends to overestimate the level of influence the Russians had with their allies around the world. In discussing the Middle East he assumes a level of influence for the Russians that was much lower than the US's influence on its own allies. After the 67 war he continually discusses the Soviets intransigence and refusal to reign in their allies like Nasser. At one point he discusses a Russian peace proposal and describes it as radical. He says that there is no way that the US could get its ally, Israel, to agree to these terms, but then he turns right around and accuses the Soviets of not forcing terms on Nasser. I don't understand why the author believes that the Soviets had more influence over Nasser, to the point they could impose terms on him, than we had over Israel. The way the author makes it out is that the Syrains, Egyptians, ect were mere vassal states to the Russians, whereas the Israelis were more on equal terms. The author gives no evidence for his view that the Soviets had more influence or why they would have, but he simply takes it as a given that they did. The idea that anyone could dictate terms to Nasser seems ridiculous to me though.The other problem I have with his Middle East section is he tacitly legitimizes expansion of territory through war by describing the very notion of Israel going back to the pre 67 borders as radical. I understand realpolitik and that the US can't impose terms nor is morality always a good guide for national policy, but I think it is in US interest, as rule, to not legitimize any territorial gains through war whether defensive or offensive.The last section I had a problem with was the author's discussion of Chile. This is one area of history I have neglected. I know the parameters of what happened but that is it. I had no preconceived notions at all, and readily admit my ignorance of the history behind this controversy. With that said Dr. Kissenger did not achieve his desired results with me in this section. He sounded defensive and at times hyper aggressive, while at other time apologetic, so much so that in the end I went back and forth over whether he was hiding something or his ego was offended which made him lash out. In the end the tone in this section was very different from the rest of the book. I think he would have done better just presenting his version without the emotion.I have gone on long enough, and yet I haven't talked about his and Nixon's trips to China. There is just too much to go over to do it justice. I will reiterate that my review is mixed. This is an essential read for any real historian. The value in this work far exceeds its effort, even though this book is definitely a labor and a chore. The author obviously sees his contribution to history through rose colored glasses. He ignores a lot of information that would be critical of the version of history he puts forth, but that is his right. He is writing his version of this history, and I think this work stands out. No matter what you think of the man he is one of the most important figures in US history, and as such his words are of profound importance. This is a must read despite its many problems. As with any book come into it with a critical mind and you will be rewarded for your effort.