Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle

I was a history major in college and am a Vietnam-era veteran. Dr Biddle's work is perhaps too complex for most other than professional soldiers or academics, but it gave me an insight into our armed forces and into the involvement of the United States in the various wars during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This is a book that involves both strategy and international relations. I think it would be of interest to military professionals (Biddle was on the faculty of the U. S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA), historians, academics, and those interested in international relations.

An extremely important book, one of the best analyses of the efficacy of military power I have encountered. The author argues convincingly that the crucial variable determining the outcome of battles is not so much the difference in power or the difference in weaponry, etc. but the espousal of the "modern doctrine". A detailed evaluation of the outcome of Operation Michael and even more so the unexpected and counterintuitive outcome of Operation Goodwood bears out the author's claims.

Prof Terry Tucker, Senior Doctrine Developer, Saudi Arabian NG Modernization Program; The author presents a balanced, provocative and well presented case for how victory or defeat occurs in battle. This book is designed for both the tecnical numbers kind of person and also the less technical. The chapters can be read as a stand alone or you can also go through the entire book. Either way it has immense value.The thesis of this book is that force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which forces are used in combat is centrally important. This book is great reading, is controversial in its presentation but clearly provides both empirical and quantitative analysis to support his position. THIS BOOK IS A MUST READ.

Biddle's main thesis is that past a certain point force employment is more relevant to military capability than technology, and he does a good job reviewing historical cases. Moreover, he breaks down the modern underpinnings of force employment into very basic, easily understandable mechanics. This thesis not only counters much of the public's wisdom concerning military capability but apparently much of the wisdom among many members of the US armed services. I'm not sure that the thesis holds up as well in regards to air and naval warfare, but that does not seem to detract from the overall conclusions drawn in the book.

The author's main thesis is that technology and material factors are less important than how force is applied (or 'force employment' as is Biddle's preferred phrase). Biddle argues that the US military (particularly post Gulf Wars) is too technology focused and that the "Revolution in Military Affairs" is placing too much emphasis on material factors to the detriment of doctrine. He argues that the basic military doctrine which evolved in late WWI (which he terms the "Modern System") is still key to victory and technology has modified some of the specifics of how it is applied, but has not changed the fundamental doctrine in a 'revolutionary' way.Overall, he gives an interesting analysis (and a semi-predictive model) of how proper application of this "modern system" influences the outcome of battles. He focuses on how the Modern System includes the use of dispersion, cover, concealment, small independent units, and combined arms in a very interesting way. The book is largely a rebuttal to the more extreme arguments made by advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs, and I feel that sometimes the author overplays his arguments to counter the RMA advocates.

Stephen Biddle attempts to make the case that force employment methods and associated human skills are a more important determinant of military success than high technology. Of course, this argument runs contrary to most thinking in the US military establishment, where a techno-centric viewpoint reigns supreme. As a 30-year participant in the military systems development process in a number of capacities, I happen to agree with most aspects of Biddle's argument. However, I don't think that reading his book necessarily would have made me a believer. Also, I think his argument is more applicable to ground warfare than to sea or air operations. The argument presented in Biddle's book is actually an expanded version of a similar position advanced in a Military Operations Research paper he co-authored in 2002 titled, The Interaction of Skill and Technology in Combat. For people interested in this subject and how future military capabilities should be structured, Biddle's book is well worth the read. However, making any headway against the conventional wisdom with respect to military concepts or the big bucks involved in weapons procurement is likely to be an uphill slog.

It was a gift for my daughter. She was happy with it!

Excellent product and service thank you

My husband read the book with great interest - but found the book a bit too academic.