Nic FieldsSyracuse 415-13 BC: Destruction of the Athenian Imperial Fleet: 195

Great book

This is a good general introduction to the disastrous Athenian-led expedition against Syracuse. However, it is rather better at reporting and describing the events and the campaign itself than it is as explaining the motivations and general background and aftermath of it. In addition, as is often the case with Osprey publications, there are a number of glitches here and there and the author has taken a few "short-cuts", probably because of size constraints.For me, the main merit of this book was to show the long string of misguided decisions and strategic failures that plagued the expedition almost from the very beginning. As mentioned in the title of this review, almost everything that could go wrong did go wrong. However, and contrary to the author's explanations who seems to follow Thucydides rather uncritically at times, the expedition itself, while certainly ambitious, was not as hubristic and foolhardy. This is what Thucydides states, but his bias is rather obvious here: he uses it to condemn the radical form of Athenian democracy that he was opposed to, while also showing, just like Nic Fields does, that the expedition very nearly took Syracuse.Moreover, the speech and objectives that Thucydides ascribes to Alcibiades and which was supposedly made before the Athenian Assembly should also not be taken at face value, contrary to what the author does. The substance of it was to stir things up so the expedition's objectives are suitably grandiose: to conquer Sicily as a first step towards attacking Carthage before coming back to crush Sparta and its allies with overwhelming force. This could be the king of "jingoist" glorious speech that a talented politician might make to stir the crowds by appealing to their pride to get what he wants - for the expedition to go ahead. It does not imply that he really believed in it, neither does it mean that the stated objectives for the expedition were the real ones. Moreover, as some modern historians have mentioned, it is even likely that these grand objectives were never disclosed in front of the Athenian Assembly but were mentioned by Alcibiades later on, when in exile in Sparta, this time to stir the reluctant Spartans into resuming the war against Athens. Anyway, as mentioned, the objectives do not make strategic or military sense. What is more likely, however, was that the expedition's objective was intended to conquer Syracuse to secure its corn for Athens because the need to import large amounts of grain through the Hellespont was always Athens major weakness. Controlling directly one of the main areas of supply would therefore help ensure Athens ability to withstand any war, regardless of the state of its finances since the grain could be obtained as tribute.There are other tensions in Thucydides' story which are replicated by the author and neither discussed nor addressed. One is the idea that this was a massive expedition, and even the biggest one ever sent by Athens. This is in fact incorrect - the expedition sent to Egypt in 460 BC was larger - but Thucydides uses this exaggeration to create dramatic effect. Moreover, the composition of the initial fleet, as shown by Nic Fields, is interesting and it is a pity he does not draw conclusions from it. The Athenians only provided slightly less than 30% of the hoplites (1500 out of 5100) and only a very small number of cavalry (30). Their major contributions was in ships (100 triremes out of 134) and in rowers and crews, precisely those that were the support for the radical democratic faction. You cannot help wondering whether the low proportion of wealthier Athenian hoplites and the ridiculously small number of Athenian cavalry (2.5% of the total number of cavalry that Athens could field) simply reflects the relative lack of enthusiasm of these property classes with regards to what they would have perceived as foreign and foolhardy adventure.Then there is another significant point that the author does not really explain. While he does mention that recalling Alcibiades to make him stand trial was a major blunder, at least in military terms, he does not show how this was linked with the nomination and role of Nikeas. The latter was the head of the conservative faction. Both his faction's position, against foreign adventures, and his own ultra-cautious and ultra-prudent character made him particularly ill-suited to lead the expedition. His nomination at the head of the expedition alongside Alcibiades and Lamachon, however, should be seen as one of the typical compromises that the Athenian democracy came up with: the leader of the conservatives, plus the leader of the radicals, plus an experienced no-nonsense soldier. The removal of Alcibiades, possibly the most dynamic and boldest of the three and certainly the one who was the most strongly in favour of the expedition was certainly disastrous. So, from the very beginning, and this is something that Nic Fields hints at several times, the expedition was plagued by inadequate leadership which delayed and squandered any strategic advantage and many tactical advantages that the expedition may have had to begin with.Another element that appears throughout the story is Nikeas' ineptitude and hugely uninspiring leadership as a soldier even on a tactical level. At a time when generals lead from the front and often got killed in the process, as happened to both Lamachon and Eurymedon, there is no mention whatsoever as to what Nikeas might have been up to during any of the major attacks or battles. So when the author mentions "the lunacy of Nikeas" who refused to withdraw without the permission of the Assembly and delayed for a month instead of saving what could be saved, this mention, while strictly correct, comes rather late in the day. At every stage, Nikeas' behaviour was so inept that we probably could not have done any worse had his intention been to sabotage the whole expedition from the beginning.Finally, there are a number of glitches in the book. One quibble, which makes this book a bit difficult to use for wargaming purposes is that while there are numbers for the besiegers, there are none provided for the Syracusans and their allies. However, the estimates provided for the Athenian losses and the state of their remaining manpower after the disaster are great. Another glitch, one of the most glaring ones, are the mistakes in the map page 88 in the aftermath section and which summarizes the war in the Agean between 413 and 411 BC. The two red arrows at the bottom should be blue ones since they are obviously Peloponnesian expeditions. Also, the trireme showing Samos should be a red one and not a blue one, since the main Athenian naval base was based on this island, as mentioned in the text. There are also a few other editorial glitches, such as repetitions. The plates are mostly good, or even great. The illustrator has chosen to show both sides with linen corselets, rather than leather ones, although this is a bit controversial. He has also, more to my surprise, show Gylippos and his relief force arriving bare-footed (after marching for dozens of miles) while the crowd of Syracusans are all wearing sandals. I am not sure how accurate this really is.For those wanting to read more on this topic, or go into more detail, the two best books I have come across are Donald Kagan's "The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition" and the still older "Armada from Athens", by Peter Green, although the latter is, sadly, out of print.

When it comes to excellent introductions for history's great and lesser- known military campaigns, the Osprey 'Campaign' series is the best around. This book is well written, well illustrated and well edited.The book recounts Athens's disastrous campaign against the only other democracy in the Greek World. It gives us an overview of the two opposing sides, giving us short biographies of men like Alcibiades, Nikias, Lamachos, Hermokrates and numerous others.It then shows us the make up of the two warring armies, their citizen militia, panoply, tactics, cavalry and navy. After the author has helped build up our knowledge of the two armies, he then sets out their plans and strategy, and gives us an idea of what both sides were trying to achieve.Having helped set the scene, the author then gives us a view of the actual campaign - how it started, the land and navy battles, and the campaign's aftermath. A number of detailed tactical and strategic maps help give you a better idea of troop and navy movements throughout the campaign. These are presented as 3D 'bird's eye view' maps. Two of these maps are presented in this book - the first looks at the battle for Anapos, the other shows the battle for the control of Epipolai.The author also provides dozens of photographs of the area as it is today, giving you a better look at the local landmarks as the Greeks saw them. Other photos show you some museum finds such as helmets, weapons and stone stele and statues.It is also worth noting Peter Dennis's excellent illustrations. He provides three colour plates for this book and they show - the arrival of the Spartans, the night attack on Epipolai and the final naval engagement. All of these illustrations are of the very highest quality. Peter Dennis is a brilliant artist, and he also provides good commentary on what the paintings illustrate.I'd say that this is the best single volume on the Syracusan Campaign. If you have an interest in Ancient Greece then this book is an absolute must have. It also definitely deserves a spot on the shelf of any Osprey collector, history buff or any interested non-expert.

The author, Nic Fields, did an excellent job. This book is well written and easy to follow. As with all Osprey books, it contains an assortment of strategic maps, 3-D birds eye view battle maps, photos, and full color illustrations. The maps are clear and uncluttered. Each one provides the proper amount of relevant information. The movements and fortifications of the opposing sides are color coded or marked with symbols. As a result, the reader can easily follow the phases of the battle. The photographs consist of recent views of the battlefield, as well as images of Greek vases and artifacts. These photos are well placed and make a good contribution to the text. The book is separated into the usual chapters found in the Campaign series of books. The author's writing style is easy to follow and the book is well organized. This is worth noting as the battle had numerous complicating events. The moral of both the Athenians and Syracusans fluctuated dramatically throughout the campaign. That said, the author ably guides the reader through these numerous events. One example of a complicated event can be found with the system of Athenian walls intended to circumvent the city. They were followed by small skirmishes and Syracusan counter walls. The author does an excellent job of orienting the reader to understand how and when these various walls were constructed. The battlefield commanders also added a unique dimension to this campaign. The initial Athenian leader, Alcibiades, changed sides multiple times. The first time occurred when Athens recalled him home early in the campaign. This resulted in the invasion being led by Nikias, who was originally opposed to the idea. Alcibiades subsequently sided with the Spartans, the Persians and eventually returned to the Athenians. Despite the complicating aspects of this campaign, the author is able to move things along in a logical order. He also spends time describing the equipment and battle tactics used by the Greeks. In the end, he is able to place this battle into the overall context of the Peloponnesian War. Ultimately, this Athenian disaster precipitated their eventual defeat by Sparta. All in all, this book is well written. Mr. Fields took a complicated battle and made it understandable.

To be honest here, I thought the book rated around 3.5 stars but I gave it a 3 because of certain limitations. Nic Fields' book traces the Athenian campaign against the city of Syracuse in Sicily that ended in total disaster. He make it clear that the campaign was an act of sheer folly since the Athenian leadership clearly wasn't up to the task. A turning event in the Peloponnesian War, this disastrous defeat of the Athenian military directly led to downfall of the their empire and imperial ambitions.The book follows the typical Osprey Campaign series format. The book comes well illustrated with maps, photos and good artworks that clearly show the author's intents. The author writes about the origins of this campaign, then the commanders, the make up of the opposing armies and their relative plans. All this were well written, well explained and its appears that the author spent considerable amount of time inside the British Museum researching all this. The unfortunate thing lies in the fact that perhaps he went into too much details in this part of the book. Out of 96 pages of the book, the story about the campaign don't start until page 49. And the narrative of the campaign ends at page 86. Rest of the book informed the reader of the consequences of the Athenian defeat that of course, led to the downfall of Athens and her empire.So that is only 38 pages of campaign narrative of which, many of these pages got illustrations, maps and photographs. So in basic essence, there isn't much written about the actual campaign at all which sound bit ironic since that's suppose to be the key element of this book. The author also don't stray too far from the principle source of this campaign. Author's campaign narrative basically summarized Thucydides' account. In fact, when discussing the campaign from start to finish, he rarely ever stray from Thucydides' accounts. I know that Thucydides is the primary source to all this but couldn't the author add some few original thoughts of his own? He makes no effort to put in his insights into the campaign at all.I supposed the book could be useful to readers whose knowledge of the Peloponnesian War is totally raw and uninitiated since its clearly written and events clarified. But to anyone's else, you might be better off just reading Thucydides' book.